Over a cup of Coffee and a pint of Insanity

COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc. vs.

HON. BLAS F. OPLE, COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION

JUNE 30, 1988

Facts:

Respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union. The Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code.

Petitioner pointed out that the allegations regarding dismissal from employment due to union membership were false. It also averred that the suspension and eventual dismissal of the three employees were due to infractions committed by them and that the management reserves the right to discipline erring employees. Petitioner also assailed the legality of the Union, among others.

The minister rendered its decision, ruling that there was no merit in the Union’s complaint. It also ruled that the three dismissed employees were “not without fault” but nonetheless ordered the reinstatement of the same.  At the same time, respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first offenders.

Issue:

Whether or not the minister erred in directly certifying the Union based on the latter’s self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the sales force in petitioner’s company and in ordering the reinstatement of the three dismissed employees.

Held:

The Court held that the minister failed to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation. The Court held that by relying only on the Notice of Strike, the minister had encouraged disrespect of the law. He had also erroneously vested upon himself the right to choose the collective bargaining representative which ought to have been upon the employees.

The Court held that the reinstatement of the three employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Ruling otherwise would only encourage unequal protection of the laws with respect to the rights of the management and the employees.

The court rendered the decision of the minister reversed and set aside, ordering petitioners to give the three employees their separation pay.

MANUEL SOSITO vs. AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DECEMBER 14, 1987

Facts:

Petitioner Manuel Sosito filed for an indefinite leave from the company on January 16, 1976. Months later, the company underwent a retrenchment program but offered separation pay to those who had been in the active service as of June 30, 1976 and had tendered their resignation not later than July 31, 1976. Petitioner, to avail of the benefits, submitted his resignation. The company denied him the benefits.

 Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was entitled to the benefits?

 Held:

The Court held that the petitioner was not qualified to avail of the benefits because at the time he submitted his resignation, he was not in the active service, having been on voluntary indefinite leave. The petitioner cannot just do as he please to the detriment of the company.

 The Court expressed that labor disputes aren’t necessarily immediately tipped in favor of labor. The Management also has its own rights, which must also be afforded the same protection as that of labor. The Court held “that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.”

AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.

HELD:

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.

Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.

The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.

By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD: CLICK HERE FOR RUBRICO VS. ARROYO RULING :)

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto

March 2, 2001

FACTS:

ISSUE:

1.)    Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.)    Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

HELD: See RULING for ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO here

FACTS:

 Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on Criminal Case No. 8243 wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor.

Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecution’s witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the accusation weakened the case. Furthermore, Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the 8-year-old Yvonne Traya which should’ve been apparent and proven upon conviction. Ultimately, Astorga claimed that the court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked Yvonne up which is an important element in kidnapping.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.

2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the court’s decision.

3.) Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.

RULING:

1.)    The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of the witnesses especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the case, one week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in Binaungan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.

2.)    The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since motive is not an element of the crime. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the appellant himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.

3.)    The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lock up”. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.

FACTS:

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully selling “shabu,” in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” (R.A. 6425).   

 Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991. Velasco was caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a designated poseur-buyer. Five more decks were found in her pockets.

 Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as evidence against her since those were acquired through a warrantless arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly, appellant questions the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in her possession.

 ISSUES:

1.)  Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired through a warrantless arrest.

2.)  Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest when done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person to be arrested is actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.

 Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be justified under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish that the members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when they entrapped her.

2.) Yes.  The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for in R.A. 6425, agrees with the appellants argument that under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty is prision correccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.” 

 R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. However, R.A. 7691 shows that retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. RTC’s jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation.

At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed.  Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.

FACTS:

 On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively identified by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.

Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovah’s Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to see three men emerge from inside the house.  The three men then dashed off.

Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the Paranala’s housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.

 Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and Bracamonte were at large until the latter’s arrest in October of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence that will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldn’t possible know him to merit identification.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not Bracamonte’s defense of alibi and Parnala’s lack of personal affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.

 RULING:

 It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct.  In order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims’ house at the time the crime was committed.

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify against him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness’ degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.

The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: 

RULING: CLICK HERE FOR LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RULING

Also, please follow our community for more updates : FACEBOOK PAGE and  WORDPRESS

Secretary Justice vs. Catolico

FACTS:

Two administrative complaints and four charges of “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” were formulated against Judge Alfredo Catolico.

The first complaint concerned that of the naturalization of 50 naturalized citizens which the the respondent declared the oath taking of the petitioners null and void. The second and third complaints which relate to respondent’s dismissal of the cases which have not been tried for more than thirty days and refusal to recognize not only the authority of the Court to authorize the continuation of the corresponding proceedings but also the personality of the Clerk of this Court to transmit to him the pertinent resolutions of the Court. The fourth complaint regarding the respondents alleged bias and prejudice either in his questioning of the witnesses or in acquitting the accused.

Respondent claims that all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice which require the speedy and expeditious disposition of cases. Respondents plead that “if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind rather than the heart”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent acted with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” in the four complaints charged against him.

RULING:

For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record in the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer.

In the first charge, the Court has, in a way, admonished the respondent, adding that they “should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure”

With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary, the Court had already reprimanded respondent for his offense for his refusal to “apply the law” as interpreted by the tribunal.

Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of respondent complained of by Mrs. Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were just the result of the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways and ideas of respondent which could not be categorized as serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than admonition.

While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent informed the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under the retirement and other existing laws.” Premises considered, and in line with the established policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned, moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS the cases against respondent.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

FACTS:

Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. 

RULING: 

The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children.  The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights

RULING: SEE RULING FOR BELLIS VS. BELLIS HERE

Also, click HERE if you want to know why the Renvoi Doctrine was not applied in this case. :)

Follow our community for more updates : FACEBOOK PAGE and  WORDPRESS

Corpus vs. Cabaluna

FACTS:

Lourdes Corpus was declared the owner of two parcels of land located in Barrio Bugang Municipality of Alimodian on September 5, 1955 by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 26, 1963.

On July 30, 1963, Adriano Camarista executed deed of sale to the Cabalfin couple and the document was ratified by Municipal Judge of Alimodian, Mr. Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., for the cadastral land 1762, which apparently was the same land litigated in the civil case of Corpus.

Corpus charged Judge Cabaluna with having committed “gross fraud” for ratifying a deed of sale of cadastral land 1762 despite the Judge’s supposed knowledge of the pendency of the civil case before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of the deed of sale by the respondent makes him guilty of “gross fraud”.

RULING:

For the charge of “gross fraud” to prosper there is need of clear and convincing evidence that respondent knew that one of the parcels involved in civil case 2843 and adjudicated to complainant was the same property which he awarded o the Cabalfin couples in the cadastral proceeding: such evidence is, however, wanting in the record of this case.

Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations or circumstances surrounding a particular situation, but must be supported by clear and convincing proof. 

Complainant’s failure to bring out that the respondent was cognizant of the relation of the property involved in the civil case to the land applied for in the cadastral proceeding, shows that the respondent could not have connived with the claimant Camarista and/or the Cabalfins in causing the approval of the latter’s claim over the land in question to the prejudice of the rights of the complainant.

The respondent was exonerated and the charge was dismissed.

People vs. Jabinal

FACTS:

Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959)  and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:   SEE: PEOPLE VS. JABINAL RULING HERE :)

Follow our community for more updates : FACEBOOK PAGE and  WORDPRESS

G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)

Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING: SEE RULING FOR TANADA VS. TUVERA HERE

Follow our community for more updates : FACEBOOK PAGE and  WORDPRESS