Doodles on Special Penal Laws
Anti-trafficking in BIRDS.
July 2012
These are two of my professors. As to who they are, you go and guess. I don't know if it's just me or drawing them while they're discussing really makes me retain the lesson more effectively. Anyhow, I have come to believe it does.
I enjoy drawing my professors. Don't get me wrong, these aren't caricatures or mockeries of them. These are simple drawings. Why do I draw them, you may ask. Let me tell you.
In drawing them I get to see something other students don't seem to notice. Their subtle quirks perhaps, or the way the lines on their forehead seem to appear and reappear, or the gentle manner they press their lips together in mid-sentence, or the gradual gliding of their glasses down their nose, or the sudden (if not startling) movement their ears make, or the crease on the side of their mouths, or the scar on their cheeks, or their prominent dimple, or their constellation of moles, or their chiseled nose,or their divided chin, or their shy lashes, or their receding hairline, or their arching brows.
DETAILS.
When I look at them---not just stare at them---, I see the details... and then I wonder what makes them so. Their story, surely they have one... And as I put those details into paper, I feel as though their stories are passing through my pencil. Every line, every shade, and every stroke I render, makes me feel like I am telling their stories... although not really.
And when I am done, I see them differently. They become paradoxically familiar yet unknown to me. As though I've seen more of them yet they became more enigmatic. It's like seeing one phase of a cube and knowing the existence of the rest yet remaining clueless as to what they are.
So every time my pencill kisses my paper for the last time, I'd stare down at the face I have come to draw and I say, "nice to meet you."
G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000
People vs. Taraya
FACTS:
Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are
relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the
death of Salvador Reyes.
Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution
witnesses Mariano Adillo, David Angeles
and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements
were countered by Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the
accused appellants themselves.
Prosecution witness Mariano
testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador
was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual
killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the
victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly.
The defense countered their
claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a
fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to
David Angeles’ insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena
also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with
a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself
hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of
fear and only found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel
Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber
9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of
self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and
Arly both had alibis.
Trial Court ruled against accused
appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Accused appellants appealed,
arguing that Ampie should not be charged
with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was
also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case.
They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the
killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims
which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that
Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself
at the police station at his own will.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing
of Salvador.
2.
Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.
3.
Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a
a mitigated sentence.
HELD:
A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an
appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that
at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were
united therein.
The Court ruled that David
Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar
in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a
deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them
liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the
court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been
conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.
The Court also ruled that, there
being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and
unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot
be appreciated against AMPIE. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the
offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be
charged with homicide.
As to the issue of Ampie’s
voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating
circumstance for voluntary surrender,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no
pending warrant of arrest or information filed.
When Ampie surrendered, a pending
warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already
imminent.
Stephen
Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines
G.R.
No 182178
August
15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner
was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA
9165.
Facts
state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received
information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two
proceeded to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic
allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and seized
the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioner’s possession.
Petitioner
denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasn’t doing anything illegal and
so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized
should be inadmissible since it is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.
Issue:
Whether
or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it
being the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.
HELD:
The
court held that the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on the validity of
his arrest before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings
in the lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was
deemed to have waived his right.
The
admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was
lawful.
Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The following occasions also permits a
warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in
"plain view;"
3. Search of a moving
vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless
search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The
Court held that sufficient
evidence supported the warrantless
arrest of petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto.
The police officers witnessed
petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner,
introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After
laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the
plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
The arrest having been lawful,
the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the item’s veracity was
well established.
The
Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Nolasco, et al vs. Paño
G.R. No. L-69803
October 8, 1985
Facts:
The present case was subject for resolution.
Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the
petitioners was illegal, annulling the decision of respondent Judge Paño, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the
warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the
Subversive Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be
retained in case it would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case
pending before the Special Military Commission No.1, returning the rest which
are determined irrelevant by petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the portion of the
decision regarding the retention of the properties seized. One of the petitioners
also assailed the respondent’s claim that the search was incidental to her
arrest for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not some of the properties seized
may be introduced as evidence in a separate criminal case.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners
for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers
and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized
as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners
questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items
seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or
not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
G.R. No. 178788
United Airlines vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
September 29, 2009
Facts:
International airline, petitioner United Airlines, filed a claim for income tax refund. Petitioner sought to be refunded the erroneously collected income tax from in the amount of P5,028,813.23 on passenger revenue from tickets sold in the Philippines, the uplifts of which did not originate in the Philippines. The airlines ceased operation originating form the Philippines since February 21, 1998.
Court of tAx appeals ruled the petitioner is not entitled to a refund because under the NIRC, income tax on GPB also includes gross revenue from carriage of cargoes from the Philippines. And upon assessment by the CTA, it was found out that petitioner deducted items from its cargo revenues which should have entitled the government to an amount of P 31.43 million, which is obviously higher than the amount the petitioner prayed to be refunded.
Petitioner argued that the petitioner’s supposed underpayment cannot offset his claim to a refund as established by well-settled jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund?
HELD:
Petitioner was correct in averring that his claim to a refund cannot be subject to offsetting or, as it claimed the offsetting to be, a legal compensation under Sec. 28(A)(3)(a)
“Petitioner’s (similar) tax refund claim assumes that the tax return that it filed was correct. Given, however, the finding of the CTA that petitioner, although not liable under Sec. 28(A)(3)(a) of the 1997 NIRC, is liable under Sec. 28(A)(1), the correctness of the return filed by petitioner is now put in doubt. As such, we(the court) cannot grant the prayer for a refund.”
The court held that the petitioner is not entitled to a refund, Having underpaid the GPB tax due on its cargo revenues for 1999, the amount of the former being even much higher (P31.43 million) than the tax refund sought (P5.2 million).
Relevant note:
The Court have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting [or compensation”] of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.(francia vs Intermediate appellate court)
The grant of a refund is founded on the assumption that the tax return is valid, that is, the facts stated therein are true and correct. The deficiency assessment, although not yet final, created a doubt as to and constitutes a challenge against the truth and accuracy of the facts stated in said return which, by itself and without unquestionable evidence, cannot be the basis for the grant of the refund. (CIR vs CTA)
G.R. No. 166973
National Power Corporation vs. Benjamin Ong Co
February 10, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner expropriated respondent’s property for its Lahar Project, a
project for public use
Petitioner established its claim on RA 6395,
allowing it to exercise the right to eminent domain.
Complaint was filed at the RTC on June 27,
2001. On 25 March
2002, petitioner obtained a writ of possession and on 15 April 2002 it took
possession of the property.
RTC ordered the compensation of the full market value of the land valued
at P1,179,000.00, with interest
at 6% per annum beginning 15 April 2002, the date of actual taking, until full
payment. RA 8974 sets forth the payment of land’s full market value as
distinguished to RA 6395 which entitles the land owner to only 10% of market
value.
Petitioner argues that compensation should only be an easement fee and
not the total value and that computation of compensation should be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint (Rule 67).
Issues:
Whether or not compensation will be governed by provisions on RA 6395 or
RA 8974? Who will determine?
Whether or not value of the property should be reckoned as of the filing
of the complaint or actual taking of the land?
Held:
Court held that with regard to compensation, provisions on RA 8974
should govern. Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly
include power generation, transmission and distribution projects among the
national government projects covered by the law. R.A. No. 8974 should govern
the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a national
government project.
The Court also held that the function for determining just compensation
remains judicial in character. It held that the courts have the power to
determine cases relative to the violations on the guarantees provided by the
Bill of Rights.
As to the amount to be given to respondent as compensation, the court
agreed with petitioner that compensation should be computed as of the filing of
complaint (2001) win compliance with Rule 67.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ
vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No 170180
November 23, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner
Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried
marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made
a search on him
Petitioner
denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one
of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his
bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy.
Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were
found.
Petitioner
prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal,
that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search
that followed was likewise contrary to law.
Issue:
Whether
or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting
the arrest and the search.
Alih
vs. Castro
151
SCRA 279
June 23, 1987
Facts:
Respondents
who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men.
The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger
–printing, paraffin testing and
photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.
The
petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally
seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The
respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned
that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary
because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.
Issue:
Whether
or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and
photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are
violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.
Held: Click to see Ruling for ALIH VS. CASTRO HERE. :)
G.R. No. 97347
Jaime Ong vs. Court of Appeals and Robles
couple
July 6, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Jaime Ong and respondents, Robles
couple executed an “Agreement of Purchase and Sale” with regard to 2 parcels of
land, on which a rice mill and a piggery were found and thus included. The terms and conditions of the contract
included an initial payment, payment for the loan of the sellers including
interest, and the balance to be satisfied in 4 equal quarterly installments.
As agreed, petitioner took possession of the
subject property and everything else thereon upon satisfaction of the initial
payment. However, petitioner failed to comply with the payment for the loan.
Plus, the checks that the petitioner issued to the couple as payment for the
balance were dishonored due to insufficient funds. To avoid foreclosure, the
respondent couple sold the ricemill with the knowledge and conformity of
petitioner.
Respondents sought for the rescission of the
properties due to the latter’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions
on the contract.
RTC ruled in favor of the Robles couple and
ordered the restitution of the properties. The couple were also ordered to
return an amount, as determined by the court, to Ong.
CA affirmed the decision in contemplation of
Article 1191 of The New Civil Code
Issue:
(1) whether the contract entered into by the parties may be validly
rescinded under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code as distinguished to Article
1383 of the same.
(2) whether the parties had
novated their original contract as to the time and manner of payment.
HELD:
The Contract entered into by
the parties was a “Contract to Sell” which means that the payment of the purchase price is a positive
suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious,
but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring an obligatory force.
Respondents bound themselves to deliver a deed of absolute sale and clean title covering the
two parcels of land upon full payment by the buyer of the purchase price of
P2,000,000.00 subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition of full
payment of the purchase price by the petitioner. Petitioner, however, failed to
complete payment of the purchase price. The non-fulfillment of the condition of
full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and
effect.
As to the issue on novation,
in order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following
requisites is indispensable: (1) there must be a previous valid obligation; (2)
there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract; (3)
there must be the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) there must be the
validity of the new contract. 25 The aforesaid requisites are not found
in the case at bench.