DEFINE A “WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS”?

ANS.  A writ of habeas corpus is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court of judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.


Habeas corpus when translated means “produce the body”. If a writ of habeas corpus is issued by the court, the court is basically ordering a person who has detained another to produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place, and to show sufficient cause for holding in custody the individual so detained.

WHAT IS THE “PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS?”
ANS.  The privilege of the writ is the further order from the court to release an individual if it finds his detention without legal cause or authority.

WHAT THEN MAY BE SUSPENDED: THE WRIT OR THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT?
ANS. It is the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (not the writ itself)

WHO MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE?

ANS. The President

CLICK HERE TO READ THE CONTINUATION

FOR WORDPRESS READERS, CLICK HERE

WHAT IS “MARTIAL LAW”?

BRIEFLY: Martial law is founded on necessity and is essentially police power exceptionally exercised by the executive with the aid of the military, the latter being called upon to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and the enforcement of legal norms. The purpose thereof being the preservation of the public safety and good order in times when the domination of lawless elements cannot be stopped by civil authorities.

WHO CAN DECLARE “MARTIAL LAW?
ANS. The President as commander-in-chief pursuant to Art VII, Sec 18 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHAT IS THE “COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF” CLAUSE?
The Constitution declares the President, a civilian, as the Commander-in –Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the power covers the Philippine National Police (PNP).  

The reason behind this provision is to ensure the supremacy of the civil authorities over the military forces of the government.

The President has control and direction of the conduct of war and, when necessary, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion.  However, it is only in this sense that the president may be referred to as a military officer. The President does not enlist in, nor is he inducted or drafted into forces; “he is not subject to court martial or other military discipline.”Swartz, The Powers of the President, p.215 (1963)

The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President holds supreme military authority and is the ceremonial, legal, and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. “As Commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.” Fleming v. Page, 9 How 603, 615 U.S. (1850)

WHAT POWER DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE OVER THE MILITARY?
ANS. Since the President is commander-in-chief of the Armed forces, she can demand obedience from military officers. Military officers who disobey or ignore her command can be subjected to court martial proceeding. Thus, for instance, the President as Commander-in-Chief may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry, a military officer who disobeys the President’s directive may be made to answer before a court martial. (see Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, April 15, 2006).

IN WHAT INSTANCES CAN THE PRESIDENT DECLARE MARTIAL LAW? (GROUNDS)
Ans. Martial Law depends on two factual bases: (1) the existence of invasion or rebellion, and (2) the requirements of public safety.  (Art. VII, Sec 18 of the 1987 Constitution)


CLICK THE HYPERLINK TO READ THE CONTINUATION ON FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON MARTIAL LAW

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G.R. No 101083
Minors of the Philippines vs. DENR
July 30, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner minors, represented by their parents, contended that the granting of the TLAs (Timber License Agreement) by respondent DENR was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. RTC dismissed the class suit on the ff grounds: 1)lack of cause of action; 2)the issue involved a  political question and 3)the relief sought would violate the non-impairment of contracts clause.
ISSUES:
Whether or not minors had the legal personality to initiate the suit.
Whether or not the case was justiciable.
Whether or not the relief sought would violate the non-impairment of contracts clause

RULING: Click HERE to see ruling for Minors of the Philippines vs. DENR


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G.R. No. L-41958
Donald Mead  vs. Hon. Manuel Argel, CFI
July 20, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against him for his alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created under the said law has the authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal was proper. 
RULING: Click HERE to see ruling for Mead vs. Argel, CFI
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G.R. No. 166973
National Power Corporation vs. Benjamin Ong Co
February 10, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner expropriated respondent’s property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use.
Petitioner established its claim on RA 6395, allowing it to exercise the right to eminent domain.
Complaint was filed at the RTC on June 27, 2001. On 25 March 2002, petitioner obtained a writ of possession and on 15 April 2002 it took possession of the property.
RTC ordered the compensation of the full market value of the land valued at P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum beginning 15 April 2002, the date of actual taking, until full payment. RA 8974 sets forth the payment of land’s full market value as distinguished to RA 6395 which entitles the land owner to only 10% of market value.
Petitioner argues that compensation should only be an easement fee and not the total value and that computation of compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint (Rule 67).
Issues:
Whether or not compensation will be governed by provisions on RA 6395 or RA 8974. Who will determine?
 Whether or not value of the property should be reckoned as of the filing of the complaint or actual taking of the land.

HELD: See Ruling for NPC vs. Ong Co HERE

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Click HERE for the entire discussion about the Renvoi Doctrine.


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NEW DIGEST BLOG

Posted on

Monday, August 22, 2016


Who are you to say that one person voted unwisely just because he voted differently than you? Is it not premature to judge the wisdom of a vote when the elected are yet to perform?

We are supposed to be supporting whosoever shall sit in office and participate in the  development of our nation even if these officers-elect were not those whom we voted for. But instead, some of us opted to divide ourselves into factions of supporters and bashers, forgetting that we ought to be united. Some even resort to unnecessary sexist, and perhaps even almost racist criticisms of those who won, insulting not only the elect but the electorate as well. What's worse is we hide this misdemeanor in the guise of liberty... of freedom of speech... of right.

I am not saying we have to silence ourselves in all instances, good or bad. What I am saying is that we cannot retreat from our obligations as citizens just because we do not like our new officials... and should we speak, this we must do for a noble purpose and not for the sake of it.

I admit, most of those whom I've voted for in the recent elections have lost. But even so, I refuse to say that those who voted differently than I were stupid, idiotic, --- or unwise. After all, it is wrong for me to regard my brain (or any other brain in that matter) as the standard of wisdom and intelligence. Otherwise, they should have just let me vote in behalf of everybody else.

The problem is that most, if not all, of us pledge our allegiance to a certain candidate instead of pledging our allegiance to the community we belong.  Our non-participation due to the loss of those we voted for against the victory of the other contributes to the failure of our very own progress. We shouldn't regard our officials as superheroes who will come to save us from all evil while we play the nonchalant citizens of Gotham or the avid readers of the Daily Bugle. We too must not only take an active role but one which is also significant... necessary... meaningful.

We have to realize that once there are winners, there ought to be no more opponents. No more parties. Just a community who have spoken. A community which requires respect.

We pride ourselves for our democracy, but democracy without respect is chaos.

We can either help each other towards peace, order and development as an undivided whole... OR--- bring this community into ruins by writing the names of our officials in our imaginary death notes as though they are criminals while we lie in our own graves awaiting resurrection but doing nothing. Our call.

Post-election 2013: my 2 cents

Posted on

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

Category


G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.

Issues:
1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.

Held:
SEE: RULING FOR AMBIL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN HERE


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G.R. No. 175991; August 31, 2011
JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to implement the promotion and appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III despite the directive of CHED and the Civil Service commission. Catacutan questioned the judgment, contending that he was denied due process when he was not allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the adiminstrative case against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019, was well founded despite the refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as evidence.



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G.R. No. 172602   April 13, 2007
HENRY T. GO vs.THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman and President of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the government with Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).

Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He further assert that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e).


Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.

Ruling: SEE: GO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN RULING


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CASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND
CONSULAR STAFF IN TEHRAN
Judgment of 24 May 1980

Facts:
In November 4, 1974, student militants of the group Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line barged into the US Embassy in Tehran and held US diplomats and consulars hostage for 444 days. The cause of the Iranian students’ action against the US was believed to be the latter’s grant of medical asylum to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and its refusal to turn the Shah over for trial.

The US sought recourse before the international court, asking that the hostages be freed and that reparations be given to the US by the Iranian government for the latter’s failure to carry its international legal obligations. US averred that Iran was responsible due to its initial inaction to the crisis and its subsequent statement of support to the seizure.

Issue:
Whether or not Iran was liable to the United States for the seizure of the US embassy and the hostage-taking of the US nationals by the Iranian militants.

Ruling: 
SEE: US vs. IRAN RULING


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Comelec vs Español : 149164-73 : December 10, 2003 (417 SCRA 554)



Facts: Bautista filed before the LAw Department of the Comelec a complaint against certain individuals for vote buying. By virtue of a resolution, an information was filed against respondents with the RTC. Meanwhile, criminal complaints were filed against Bautista's witnesses for vote selling.

the Law Department of the COMELEC later on recommended that the resolutionof the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be nullified because the accused are exempt and that the prosecution of election offenses were under the sole cotrol of the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the review of the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution by COMELEC and the subsequent request for its nullification was proper.

Held: SEE: COMELEC vs. ESPANOL RULING


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G.R. No. 190582               April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:
SEE: ANG LADLAD RULING


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G.R. No. 154198            January 20, 2003
PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:
Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling: see: RULLODA VS. COMELEC RULING


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G.R. No. 147589            June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. 

Issue:
1.     Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2.     Whether or not political parties may participate in the  party list elections.
3.     Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:SEE: Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec RULING


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G.R. No. 150605           December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker  and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, 
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN


Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1.     Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2.     Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3.     Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

RULING: See: Codilla vs.De Venecia RULING



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1. 

G.R. No. 163193             June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention, 
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of  advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of  Resolution 6712 was justified.

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G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, 

G.R. No. 161634             March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824             March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: SEE TECSON VS. COMELEC


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G.R. No. 150605           December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs

HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker 
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, 
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1.     Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2.     Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3.     Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.


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