G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000
People vs. Taraya
FACTS:
Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are
relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the
death of Salvador Reyes.
Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution
witnesses Mariano Adillo, David Angeles
and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements
were countered by Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the
accused appellants themselves.
Prosecution witness Mariano
testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador
was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual
killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the
victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly.
The defense countered their
claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a
fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to
David Angeles’ insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena
also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with
a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself
hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of
fear and only found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel
Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber
9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of
self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and
Arly both had alibis.
Trial Court ruled against accused
appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Accused appellants appealed,
arguing that Ampie should not be charged
with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was
also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case.
They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the
killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims
which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that
Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself
at the police station at his own will.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing
of Salvador.
2.
Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.
3.
Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a
a mitigated sentence.
HELD:
A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an
appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that
at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were
united therein.
The Court ruled that David
Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar
in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a
deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them
liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the
court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been
conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.
The Court also ruled that, there
being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and
unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot
be appreciated against AMPIE. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the
offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be
charged with homicide.
As to the issue of Ampie’s
voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating
circumstance for voluntary surrender,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no
pending warrant of arrest or information filed.
When Ampie surrendered, a pending
warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already
imminent.
