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2012
G.R. No. 190582
April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party, an organization composed of men and women
who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In
the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner
made misrepresentation in their application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling:
Case Digest: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Comelec
Posted on
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
G.R. No. 154198
January 20, 2003
PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO
Facts:
Comelec denied
petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay
Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the
highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents
cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which
prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that
it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who
filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.
Issue:
Whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she be
allowed to run for elections.
Ruling: see: RULLODA VS. COMELEC RULING
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G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners
challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec
acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1.
Whether or
not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2.
Whether or
not political parties may participate in the
party list elections.
3.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Ruling:SEE: Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec RULING
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G.R. No. 150605
December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as
Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
Facts:
Petitioner garnered the
highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district
of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification
suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation.
By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was
suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting
votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner.
Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new
resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made
his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while
petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues:
1.
Whether or
not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2.
Whether or
not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3.
Whether or
not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.
RULING: See: Codilla vs.De Venecia RULING
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1.
G.R. No. 163193 June 15,
2004
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Comelec issued
resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed
resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission
of advanced result of “unofficial”
count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would
likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited
arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under
pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial
determination.
Issue:
Whether
or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.
G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634
March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s
disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented
material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a
natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed
the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the
jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve
the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether
or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether
or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a
Filipino citizen.
G.R. No. 150605
December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M.
CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as
Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
Facts:
Petitioner garnered the
highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district
of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification
suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation.
By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was
suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting
votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed
winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a
new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made
his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while
petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues:
1.
Whether or
not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2.
Whether or
not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3.
Whether or
not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.
HELD: SEE RULING HERE FOR CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA
Case Digest: Codilla vs. de Venecia
Posted on
Monday, November 26, 2012
Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs.
Comelec
G.R. No.
162759 August 4, 2006
Petitioners
were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their
right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the
2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement
of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1
of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether
or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1
year residency.
Ruling:
see: NICOLAS-LEWIS VS. COMELEC RULING
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G.R. No.
152295 July 9, 2002
Montesclaros,
et al vs. Comelec, et al
Facts:
Petitioners
sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date
since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of
the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections
was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK
and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to
enjoin the lowering of age for
membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether
or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction imputable to respondents.
Held:
G.R. No. 180363
April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES
Facts:
In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run
for a congressional seat in the May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan
decision rendered against him in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral
turpitude.
The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner
as moot since the latter lost in the said election.
Issue:
Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when Comelec
disqualified petitioner in view of the petitioner’s conviction.
Ruling:
G.R. No. 170365
February 2, 2010
ABDUL GAFFAR P.M.
DIBARATUN vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR
Facts:
The Comelec en banc ruled
a failure of elections in precinct No. 6a/7a, Lanao del Sur
on the
second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes. The Election on said precinct was disrupted by
a commotion, was untimely suspended and never resumed. The Comelec decision, consequently
nullified the proclamation of herein petitioner dibaratun as winner.
Petitioner
Dibaratun contended that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections for
acting on herein respondents’ petition even if such petition was filed out of
time.
Issue:
Whether
or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections
Ruling:
G.R.
No. 148334. January
21, 2004
ARTURO
M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR
GREGORIO B. HONASAN
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the
manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were
conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a
special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as
well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed
from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term
of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for
the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of
the 13th elected senator.
Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the
petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners
had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single,
Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
RULING:
Ampatuan, et al. vs.
COMELEC
G.
R. No. 149803. January 31, 2002
The petitioners were
proclaimed victorious in the May 14, 2001 Maguindanao Provincial election after
the order suspending such proclamation was lifted by the COMELEC, which issued
the same. Respondents petitioned, before
the Supreme Court, the suspension of the
effects of the said proclamation and
insisted that there had been a “failure of election”. The COMELEC ordered the consolidation of respondents’
petitions and a random technical
examination on several precincts.
Petitioners contended
that by virtue of their proclamation, the proper remedy available to
respondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an
election protest.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC
had jurisdiction to act on respondents’ petitions even after proclamation of
petitioners as winners
Ruling: see: AMPATUAN VS. COMELEC RULING
Clemente vs. WCC and Rattan Art and Decorations Inc., G.R. No. L-42087, April 8,
1988
Facts:
Ricardo Clemente, a machine set-up man at Rattan
Art and Decorations Inc, died of acute cardiorespiratory
failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked
visceral congestion. The heirs’ claim for death compensation benefits under WCA
was granted. On appeal, the Commission ruled in favor of private respondent and
held that the deceased died from “bangungot” which is non-compensable, there
being no proof of fundamental preliminary link between the cause of death and the
decedent’s work.
Issue:
Whether or not there exist a
causal connection between the cause of death and the nature of work of the
deceased.
Ruling:
The Court held that the deceased died of
“heart failure”,not of “bangungot”. And that there exist the probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or
aggravated his illness that led to his death. The death was, therefore,
compensable.
Under the WCA, there is the
presumption that the illness which supervened at the time of his employment,
either arose out of or was at least aggravated by, such employment. The burden
of disproving such presumption was on the private respondent. Even granting
that deceased did die of ‘bangungot’, such phenomena is without legal or
medical basis. Where the causes of an ailment are unknown and undetermined even
by medical science, the requirement of proof of causal link between the ailment
and the working conditions should be liberalized.
BEBERISA RIÑO vs.
ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 132558, May 9, 2000
Facts:
Virgilio T. Riño Sr., was a stevedore at
Allied Port Services since July 1982. In 1992, he died of “Uremia secondary to
chronic renal failure” three days after he was rushed to the hospital after
collapsing at work. Virgilio’s widow claimed for death benefits from the SSS.
The claim was denied by the system and, subsequently, by the ECC for failure to
present proof of causal connection between the decedent’s illness and his work
as a stevedore.
Whether or not Riño’s Death was compensable under PD626 by
virtue of the increased risk theory.
Ruling:
The Court held that the decedent’s death was non-compensable.
The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio
Riño’s death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should
have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that
the nature of her husband’s employment or working conditions increased the risk
of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. Bare
allegations do not ipso facto make the death compensable. Since the petitioner failed to must adduce
evidence to prove work-connection, the denial of claim was held proper.
Limbo
vs. ECC and SSS, July 30, 2002 G.R. No.146891
Facts:
Ruben
Limbo was employed at Nestlé
Philippines, Incorporated as salesman in 1966
and was later promoted as Area Sales Supervisor in 1977 until 1996. In 1994, he
was diagnosed with elevetaed BUN, creatinine, anemia and chronic renal disease.
In 1995, he underwent a renal transplant. Limbo claimed for benefits from SSS
bu the latter denied the claim, reasoning that Limbo’s illness,
“end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy,” had no causal
relationship to his job as Area Sales Supervisor.
The ECC and CA dismissed the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not “end-stage
renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is compensable under P.D. 626
Ruling:
The Court held that
petitioner was able to show that his ailment was work-related and was, thus
compensable.
Tancinco
vs. GSIS and ECC, November 16, 2001, G.R. 132916
SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men
while off duty and repairing a service vehicle in front of his house. His widow
claimed for benefits. The GSIS and ECC denied the claim for lack of proof that
the death of Tancinco was work-related.
Issue:
Whether or not Tancinco’s
death was compensable.
Ruling:
Tancinco’s death was not
compensable.
The Court held that the facts and circumstances
surrounding the decedent’s death failed to comply with the grounds set forth in
Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules of Employees compensation for the
injury and the resulting disability or death be compensable, to wit:(1) The
employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3)
If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.
The
Court held that when the decedent died, he was not doing an act which is “basically police service in character”
though he be on active duty call or otherwise nor was he pursuing a task
ordered by his superior. He was, at the time he was killed, repairing his
vehicle at his own home. Bereft proof of compliance with the requirements, the
death was non-compensable.
Valeriano vs. ECC and
GSIS, June 8, 2000 GR 136200
Facts:
Celestino Valeriano was
employed as a firetruck driver. On the evening of July 3, 1985, after having
dinner with a friend, Valeriano met an accident
and was severely injured when the vehicle he was on collided with
another. Valeriano claimed for benefits from the GSIS which the latter denied
for being non-compensable. The ECC and CA sustained the system, reasoning that
the injury resulted not from an accident arising
out of and in the course of employment nor was it work-connected.
Issue: Whether or not
the injuries sustained by VAleriano in the collision was compensable.
Ruling:
Valeriano’s injuries
were non-compensable.
Valeriano’s contention,
citing the Hinoguin and Nitura cases, that the 24-hour doctrine be applied to
his case since the exigency of his job demand it to be so was held untenable by
the Court. The Court did not find any reasonable
connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver. Applying
the principle laid down in the Alegre case, the 24-hour doctrine is not meant
to embrace all acts and circumstances of an employee though he be on active “on
call” duty. Valeriano was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of
the orders of his superiors when he met the accident. He was also not doing an act within his duty
and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the
time he sustained his injuries. In fact, he was pursuing a purely personal and
social function when the accident happened. The accident not work-connected was, therefore, non-compensable.
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29,
1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL
FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex
launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which
called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase
of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made
available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be
provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing
the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing
the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest
to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions
of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial
court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument
that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law.
Case Digest: Caltex vs. Palomar
Posted on
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
It is the settled rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively
by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
It was however held in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy that the appellants were barred by laches, considering that it took
the appellants 15 years in raising the issue of jurisdiction (based on the
Judicial Act of 1948) from the filing of the case(January 17, 1948) to the
appeal(January 8, 1963) despite their active participation throughout the case.
The same principle was cited in the case of People vs. Regalario, holding that
parties are estopped from appealing a case after the reglemetary period provided
by law. However, in the latter case, appeal was granted in view of the gravity
of the offense and its penalty. The offense charged, having been murder, and
the penalty, having been reclusion perpetua, the Supreme Court still afforded
the appellants judicial review to avoid miscarriage of justice. A similar
ruling to that of People vs. Regalario was held in the case of People vs.
Fukuzume as opposed to the denial of the court of the appeal in the case of
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In People vs. Fukuzume, the Court granted the appeal of
the appellant for want of jurisdiction (the proper court, having been Paranaque
RTC and not Makati RTC). The court noted the distinction between the facts
surrounding the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy as a civil case and the facts
surrounding the case of People vs. Fukuzume as a criminal case.
As a general rule, question on
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal (people
vs. Fukuzume) but exception to the rule is when the appellant is barred by laches
(Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy). But even when barred by laches, appeal may still be
granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty (People vs.
Regalario).
In all three cases, the issue was
on the timeliness of the raising of the question on jurisdiction, giving due
consideration on the nature of each of the cases.
These are two of my professors. As to who they are, you go and guess. I don't know if it's just me or drawing them while they're discussing really makes me retain the lesson more effectively. Anyhow, I have come to believe it does.
I enjoy drawing my professors. Don't get me wrong, these aren't caricatures or mockeries of them. These are simple drawings. Why do I draw them, you may ask. Let me tell you.
In drawing them I get to see something other students don't seem to notice. Their subtle quirks perhaps, or the way the lines on their forehead seem to appear and reappear, or the gentle manner they press their lips together in mid-sentence, or the gradual gliding of their glasses down their nose, or the sudden (if not startling) movement their ears make, or the crease on the side of their mouths, or the scar on their cheeks, or their prominent dimple, or their constellation of moles, or their chiseled nose,or their divided chin, or their shy lashes, or their receding hairline, or their arching brows.
DETAILS.
When I look at them---not just stare at them---, I see the details... and then I wonder what makes them so. Their story, surely they have one... And as I put those details into paper, I feel as though their stories are passing through my pencil. Every line, every shade, and every stroke I render, makes me feel like I am telling their stories... although not really.
And when I am done, I see them differently. They become paradoxically familiar yet unknown to me. As though I've seen more of them yet they became more enigmatic. It's like seeing one phase of a cube and knowing the existence of the rest yet remaining clueless as to what they are.
So every time my pencill kisses my paper for the last time, I'd stare down at the face I have come to draw and I say, "nice to meet you."
Posted on
Tuesday, July 3, 2012
G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000
People vs. Taraya
FACTS:
Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are
relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the
death of Salvador Reyes.
Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution
witnesses Mariano Adillo, David Angeles
and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements
were countered by Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the
accused appellants themselves.
Prosecution witness Mariano
testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador
was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual
killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the
victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly.
The defense countered their
claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a
fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to
David Angeles’ insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena
also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with
a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself
hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of
fear and only found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel
Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber
9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of
self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and
Arly both had alibis.
Trial Court ruled against accused
appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Accused appellants appealed,
arguing that Ampie should not be charged
with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was
also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case.
They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the
killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims
which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that
Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself
at the police station at his own will.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing
of Salvador.
2.
Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.
3.
Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a
a mitigated sentence.
HELD:
A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an
appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that
at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were
united therein.
The Court ruled that David
Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar
in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a
deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them
liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the
court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been
conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.
The Court also ruled that, there
being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and
unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot
be appreciated against AMPIE. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the
offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be
charged with homicide.
As to the issue of Ampie’s
voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating
circumstance for voluntary surrender,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no
pending warrant of arrest or information filed.
When Ampie surrendered, a pending
warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already
imminent.
CASE DIGEST: PEOPLE VS. TARAYA
Posted on
Monday, July 2, 2012
Stephen
Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines
G.R.
No 182178
August
15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner
was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA
9165.
Facts
state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received
information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two
proceeded to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic
allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and seized
the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioner’s possession.
Petitioner
denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasn’t doing anything illegal and
so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized
should be inadmissible since it is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.
Issue:
Whether
or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it
being the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.
HELD:
The
court held that the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on the validity of
his arrest before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings
in the lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was
deemed to have waived his right.
The
admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was
lawful.
Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The following occasions also permits a
warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in
"plain view;"
3. Search of a moving
vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless
search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The
Court held that sufficient
evidence supported the warrantless
arrest of petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto.
The police officers witnessed
petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner,
introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After
laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the
plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
The arrest having been lawful,
the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the item’s veracity was
well established.
The
Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.