2012


G.R. No. 190582               April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:
SEE: ANG LADLAD RULING


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G.R. No. 154198            January 20, 2003
PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:
Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling: see: RULLODA VS. COMELEC RULING


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G.R. No. 147589            June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. 

Issue:
1.     Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2.     Whether or not political parties may participate in the  party list elections.
3.     Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:SEE: Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec RULING


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G.R. No. 150605           December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker  and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, 
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN


Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1.     Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2.     Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3.     Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

RULING: See: Codilla vs.De Venecia RULING



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1. 

G.R. No. 163193             June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention, 
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of  advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of  Resolution 6712 was justified.

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G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, 

G.R. No. 161634             March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824             March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: SEE TECSON VS. COMELEC


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G.R. No. 150605           December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs

HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker 
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, 
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1.     Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2.     Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3.     Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.


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Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

Facts: 
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the  Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.

Ruling: 
see: NICOLAS-LEWIS VS. COMELEC RULING



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G.R. No. 152295            July 9, 2002
Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

Facts:

Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of  age for membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents.

Held:



G.R. No. 180363               April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES

Facts:
In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional seat in the May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered against him in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.

The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the latter lost in the said election.

Issue: 
Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the petitioner’s conviction.

Ruling:



G.R. No. 170365               February 2, 2010
ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR

Facts: 
The Comelec en banc ruled a failure of elections in precinct No. 6a/7a, Lanao del Sur
on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The Election on said precinct was disrupted by a commotion, was untimely suspended and never resumed. The Comelec decision, consequently nullified the proclamation of herein petitioner dibaratun as winner.

Petitioner Dibaratun contended that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections for acting on herein respondents’ petition even if such petition was filed out of time.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections

Ruling:



G.R. No.  148334.  January 21, 2004
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th elected senator.

Issue:
1Whether or not  Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:


Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC
G. R. No. 149803.  January 31, 2002

The petitioners were proclaimed victorious in the May 14, 2001 Maguindanao Provincial election after the order suspending such proclamation was lifted by the COMELEC, which issued the same.  Respondents petitioned, before the Supreme Court, the suspension of  the effects of  the said proclamation and insisted that there had been a “failure of election”. The COMELEC  ordered the consolidation of respondents’ petitions and  a random technical examination on several precincts.

Petitioners contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC had jurisdiction to act on respondents’ petitions even after proclamation of petitioners as winners


Clemente vs. WCC and Rattan Art and Decorations Inc., G.R. No. L-42087, April 8, 1988


Facts: 

Ricardo Clemente, a machine set-up man at Rattan Art and Decorations Inc, died of acute cardiorespiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked visceral congestion. The heirs’ claim for death compensation benefits under WCA was granted. On appeal, the Commission ruled in favor of private respondent and held that the deceased died from “bangungot” which is non-compensable, there being no proof of fundamental preliminary link between the cause of death and the decedent’s work.

Issue:
Whether or not there exist a causal connection between the cause of death and the nature of work of the deceased.

Ruling:

The Court held that the deceased died of “heart failure”,not of “bangungot”. And that there exist the probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death. The death was, therefore, compensable.

Under the WCA, there is the presumption that the illness which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of or was at least aggravated by, such employment. The burden of disproving such presumption was on the private respondent. Even granting that deceased did die of ‘bangungot’, such phenomena is without legal or medical basis. Where the causes of an ailment are unknown and undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized.

Case Digest: Clemente vs. WCC

Posted on

Monday, October 22, 2012


BEBERISA RIÑO vs. ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 132558, May 9, 2000

Facts:

Virgilio T. Riño Sr., was a stevedore at Allied Port Services since July 1982. In 1992, he died of “Uremia secondary to chronic renal failure” three days after he was rushed to the hospital after collapsing at work. Virgilio’s widow claimed for death benefits from the SSS. The claim was denied by the system and, subsequently, by the ECC for failure to present proof of causal connection between the decedent’s illness and his work as a stevedore.

Issue:
Whether or not Riño’s Death was compensable under PD626 by virtue of the increased risk theory.

Ruling:

The Court held that the decedent’s death was non-compensable.

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño’s death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husband’s employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. Bare allegations do not ipso facto make the death compensable.  Since the petitioner failed to must adduce evidence to prove work-connection, the denial of claim was held proper.


Limbo vs. ECC and SSS, July 30, 2002 G.R. No.146891

Facts:

Ruben Limbo was employed at Nestlé Philippines, Incorporated as salesman in 1966 and was later promoted as Area Sales Supervisor in 1977 until 1996. In 1994, he was diagnosed with elevetaed BUN, creatinine, anemia and chronic renal disease. In 1995, he underwent a renal transplant. Limbo claimed for benefits from SSS bu the latter denied the claim, reasoning that Limbo’s illness, “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy,” had no causal relationship to his job as Area Sales Supervisor. The ECC and CA dismissed the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is compensable under P.D. 626

Ruling:

The Court held that petitioner was able to show that his ailment was work-related and was, thus compensable.

Generally, for the sickness and the resulting disability to be compensable, it must be among the listed occupational diseases under the Amended Rules on Employees compensation. But the list is not exclusive and ailments not enumerated therein may still be compensable if claimant could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions or that there exist a “reasonable work connection”. The Court upheld the physician’s report which certified that Limbo’s illness was aggravated by the nature of his work. The ailment, being work-connected, was compensable.


Tancinco vs. GSIS and ECC, November 16, 2001,  G.R. 132916

Facts:

SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men while off duty and repairing a service vehicle in front of his house. His widow claimed for benefits. The GSIS and ECC denied the claim for lack of proof that the death of Tancinco was work-related.

Issue:
Whether or not Tancinco’s death was compensable.

Ruling:

Tancinco’s death was not compensable.

The Court held that the facts and circumstances surrounding the decedent’s death failed to comply with the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules of Employees compensation for the injury and the resulting disability or death be compensable, to wit:(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.
The Court held that when the decedent died, he was not doing an act which is “basically police service in character” though he be on active duty call or otherwise nor was he pursuing a task ordered by his superior. He was, at the time he was killed, repairing his vehicle at his own home. Bereft proof of compliance with the requirements, the death was non-compensable.


Valeriano vs. ECC and GSIS, June 8, 2000 GR 136200

Facts:
Celestino Valeriano was employed as a firetruck driver. On the evening of July 3, 1985, after having dinner with a friend, Valeriano met an accident  and was severely injured when the vehicle he was on collided with another. Valeriano claimed for benefits from the GSIS which the latter denied for being non-compensable. The ECC and CA sustained the system, reasoning that the injury resulted not from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment nor was it work-connected.

Issue: Whether or not the injuries sustained by VAleriano in the collision was compensable.
Ruling:

Valeriano’s injuries were non-compensable.

Valeriano’s contention, citing the Hinoguin and Nitura cases, that the 24-hour doctrine be applied to his case since the exigency of his job demand it to be so was held untenable by the Court. The Court did not find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver. Applying the principle laid down in the Alegre case, the 24-hour doctrine is not meant to embrace all acts and circumstances of an employee though he be on active “on call” duty. Valeriano was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met the accident.  He was also not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. In fact, he was pursuing a purely personal and social function when the accident happened. The accident not work-connected was, therefore, non-compensable.

Criminal Procedure: Rights of the Accused 
(...with my crush/professor. Teehee! If you tell her, I'll hunt you!)

RULE 115, SECTION 1: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Posted on

Tuesday, October 2, 2012


G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

FACTS:

In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

 Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

Issue:
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

It is the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

It was however held in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy that the appellants were barred by laches, considering that it took the appellants 15 years in raising the issue of jurisdiction (based on the Judicial Act of 1948) from the filing of the case(January 17, 1948) to the appeal(January 8, 1963) despite their active participation throughout the case. The same principle was cited in the case of People vs. Regalario, holding that parties are estopped from appealing a case after the reglemetary period provided by law. However, in the latter case, appeal was granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty. The offense charged, having been murder, and the penalty, having been reclusion perpetua, the Supreme Court still afforded the appellants judicial review to avoid miscarriage of justice. A similar ruling to that of People vs. Regalario was held in the case of People vs. Fukuzume as opposed to the denial of the court of the appeal in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In People vs. Fukuzume, the Court granted the appeal of the appellant for want of jurisdiction (the proper court, having been Paranaque RTC and not Makati RTC). The court noted the distinction between the facts surrounding the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy as a civil case and the facts surrounding the case of People vs. Fukuzume as a criminal case.

As a general rule, question on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal (people vs. Fukuzume) but exception to the rule is when the appellant is barred by laches (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy). But even when barred by laches, appeal may still be granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty (People vs. Regalario).

In all three cases, the issue was on the timeliness of the raising of the question on jurisdiction, giving due consideration on the nature of each of the cases.


Doodles on Special Penal Laws


Anti-trafficking in BIRDS.

LAW SCHOOL DOODLES:Anti-Trafficking

Posted on

Wednesday, July 4, 2012

Doodles on Special Penal Laws



RA 7610... PD 603... SADAKO.


The relevance is high.


Either that or I'm the one who's high.^_^







These are two of my professors. As to who they are, you go and guess. I don't know if it's just me or drawing them while they're discussing really makes me retain the lesson more effectively. Anyhow, I have come to believe it does.

I enjoy drawing my professors. Don't get me wrong, these aren't caricatures or mockeries of them. These are simple drawings. Why do I draw them, you may ask. Let me tell you.

In drawing them I get to see something other students don't seem to notice. Their subtle quirks perhaps, or the way the lines on their forehead seem to appear and reappear, or the gentle manner they press their lips together in mid-sentence, or the gradual gliding of their glasses down their nose, or the sudden (if not startling) movement their ears make, or the crease on the side of their mouths, or the scar on their cheeks, or their prominent dimple, or their constellation of moles, or their chiseled nose,or their divided chin, or their shy lashes, or their receding hairline, or their arching brows.

DETAILS.

When I look at them---not just stare at them---, I see the details... and then I wonder what makes them so. Their story, surely they have one... And as I put those details into paper, I feel as though their stories are passing through my pencil. Every line, every shade, and every stroke I render, makes me feel like I am telling their stories... although not really.

And when I am done, I see them differently. They become paradoxically familiar yet unknown to me. As though I've seen more of them yet they became more enigmatic. It's like seeing one phase of a cube and knowing the existence of the rest yet remaining clueless as to what they are.

So every time my pencill kisses my paper for the last time, I'd stare down at the face I have come to draw and I say, "nice to meet you."







G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000
People vs. Taraya

FACTS:

Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the death of Salvador Reyes.

Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution witnesses  Mariano Adillo, David Angeles and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements were countered by  Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the accused appellants themselves.

Prosecution witness Mariano testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly.

The defense countered their claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to David Angeles’ insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of fear and only found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber 9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and Arly both had alibis.

Trial Court ruled against accused appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Accused appellants appealed, arguing that  Ampie should not be charged with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case. They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself at the police station at his own will.

ISSUE:
1.     Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador.
2.     Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.
3.     Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a a mitigated sentence.

HELD:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were united therein.

The Court ruled that David Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.

The Court also ruled that, there being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot be appreciated against AMPIE. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be charged with homicide.

As to the issue of Ampie’s voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating circumstance for  voluntary surrender, the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.

When Ampie surrendered, a pending warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already imminent.


Stephen Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No 182178
August 15, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA 9165.

Facts state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two proceeded to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and seized the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioner’s possession.

Petitioner denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasn’t doing anything illegal and so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized should be inadmissible since it is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it being the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

HELD:

The court held that the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on the validity of his arrest before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings in the lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was deemed to have waived his right.

The admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was lawful.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)     When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)     When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)     When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The following occasions also permits a warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The Court held that sufficient evidence supported  the warrantless arrest of petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.

The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest.  After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

The arrest having been lawful, the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the item’s veracity was well established.

The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.