Doodles on Special Penal Laws
Anti-trafficking in BIRDS.
These are two of my professors. As to who they are, you go and guess. I don't know if it's just me or drawing them while they're discussing really makes me retain the lesson more effectively. Anyhow, I have come to believe it does.
I enjoy drawing my professors. Don't get me wrong, these aren't caricatures or mockeries of them. These are simple drawings. Why do I draw them, you may ask. Let me tell you.
In drawing them I get to see something other students don't seem to notice. Their subtle quirks perhaps, or the way the lines on their forehead seem to appear and reappear, or the gentle manner they press their lips together in mid-sentence, or the gradual gliding of their glasses down their nose, or the sudden (if not startling) movement their ears make, or the crease on the side of their mouths, or the scar on their cheeks, or their prominent dimple, or their constellation of moles, or their chiseled nose,or their divided chin, or their shy lashes, or their receding hairline, or their arching brows.
DETAILS.
When I look at them---not just stare at them---, I see the details... and then I wonder what makes them so. Their story, surely they have one... And as I put those details into paper, I feel as though their stories are passing through my pencil. Every line, every shade, and every stroke I render, makes me feel like I am telling their stories... although not really.
And when I am done, I see them differently. They become paradoxically familiar yet unknown to me. As though I've seen more of them yet they became more enigmatic. It's like seeing one phase of a cube and knowing the existence of the rest yet remaining clueless as to what they are.
So every time my pencill kisses my paper for the last time, I'd stare down at the face I have come to draw and I say, "nice to meet you."
G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000
People vs. Taraya
FACTS:
Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are
relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the
death of Salvador Reyes.
Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution
witnesses Mariano Adillo, David Angeles
and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements
were countered by Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the
accused appellants themselves.
Prosecution witness Mariano
testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night Salvador
was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual
killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the
victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly.
The defense countered their
claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a
fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to
David Angeles’ insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena
also testified that on the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with
a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself
hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of
fear and only found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel
Martinez testified that Ampie did surrender himself at the police station on Octiber
9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but contended that he did so out of
self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar and
Arly both had alibis.
Trial Court ruled against accused
appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Accused appellants appealed,
arguing that Ampie should not be charged
with murder since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was
also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case.
They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the
killing of Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims
which were not supported by clear evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that
Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered himself
at the police station at his own will.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing
of Salvador.
2.
Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.
3.
Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a
a mitigated sentence.
HELD:
A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an
appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that
at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were
united therein.
The Court ruled that David
Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar
in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a
deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to likewise render them
liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the
court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been
conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.
The Court also ruled that, there
being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and
unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot
be appreciated against AMPIE. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the
offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be
charged with homicide.
As to the issue of Ampie’s
voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating
circumstance for voluntary surrender,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no
pending warrant of arrest or information filed.
When Ampie surrendered, a pending
warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time was already
imminent.
Stephen
Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines
G.R.
No 182178
August
15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner
was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA
9165.
Facts
state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received
information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two
proceeded to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic
allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and seized
the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioner’s possession.
Petitioner
denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasn’t doing anything illegal and
so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized
should be inadmissible since it is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.
Issue:
Whether
or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it
being the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.
HELD:
The
court held that the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on the validity of
his arrest before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings
in the lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was
deemed to have waived his right.
The
admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was
lawful.
Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The following occasions also permits a
warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in
"plain view;"
3. Search of a moving
vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless
search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The
Court held that sufficient
evidence supported the warrantless
arrest of petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto.
The police officers witnessed
petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner,
introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After
laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the
plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
The arrest having been lawful,
the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the item’s veracity was
well established.
The
Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Nolasco, et al vs. Paño
G.R. No. L-69803
October 8, 1985
Facts:
The present case was subject for resolution.
Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the
petitioners was illegal, annulling the decision of respondent Judge Paño, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the
warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the
Subversive Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be
retained in case it would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case
pending before the Special Military Commission No.1, returning the rest which
are determined irrelevant by petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the portion of the
decision regarding the retention of the properties seized. One of the petitioners
also assailed the respondent’s claim that the search was incidental to her
arrest for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not some of the properties seized
may be introduced as evidence in a separate criminal case.